While research into building robust and survivable networks has steadily intensified in recent years, similar efforts at the application level and below have focused primarily on attack discovery, ignoring the larger issue of how to gracefully recover from an intrusion at that level. Our work attempts to bridge this inherent gap between theory and practice through the introduction of a new architectural technique, which we call rollback and huddle. Inspired by concepts made popular in the world of software debug, we propose the inclusion of extra on-chip hardware for the efficient storage and tracing of execution contexts. Upon the detection of some software protection violation, the application is restarted at the last known safe checkpoint (the rollback part). During this deterministic replay, an additional hw/sw module is then loaded that can increase the level of system monitoring, log more detailed information about any future attack source, and potentially institute a live patch of the vulnerable part of the software executable (the huddle part). Our experimental results show that this approach could have a practical impact on modern computing system architectures, by allowing for the inclusion of low-overhead software security features while at the same time incorporating an ability to gracefully recover from attack.