
@article {BauSte10A,
	title = {A Case Study in Hardware Trojan Design and Implementation},
	journal = {International Journal of Information Security (IJIS)},
	volume = {10},
	number = {1},
	year = {2011},
	pages = {1-14},
	abstract = {As integrated circuits (ICs) continue to have an overwhelming presence in our digital information-dominated world, having trust in their manufacture and distribution mechanisms is crucial. However, with ever-shrinking transistor technologies, the cost of new fabrication facilities is becoming prohibitive, pushing industry to make greater use of potentially less reliable foreign sources for their IC supply. The 2008 Computer Security Awareness Week (CSAW) Embedded Systems Challenge at the Polytechnic Institute of NYU highlighted some of the vulnerabilities of the IC supply chain in the form of a hardware hacking challenge. This paper explores the design and implementation of our winning entry.},
	author = {Alex Baumgarten and Michael Steffen and Matthew Clausman and Joseph Zambreno}
}
@article {BauTya10A,
	title = {Preventing Integrated Circuit Piracy using Reconfigurable Logic Barriers},
	journal = {IEEE Design and Test of Computers},
	volume = {27},
	number = {1},
	year = {2010},
	month = {January},
	pages = {66-75},
	abstract = {Hardware metering to prevent IC piracy is a challenging and important problem. The authors propose a combinational locking scheme based on intelligent placement of the barriers throughout the design in which the objective is to maximize the effectiveness of the barriers and to minimize the overhead.},
	author = {Alex Baumgarten and Akhilesh Tyagi and Joseph Zambreno}
}
@conference {SatBau09A,
	title = {Architectural Support for Automated Software Attack Detection, Recovery, and Prevention},
	booktitle = {Proceedings of the International Conference on Embedded and Ubiquitous Computing (EUC)},
	year = {2009},
	month = {August},
	abstract = {Attacks on software systems are an increasingly serious problem from an economic and security standpoint. Many techniques have been proposed ranging from simple compiler modifications to full-scale re-engineering of computer systems architecture aimed at attack detection. Traditional techniques ignore the arguably more important problem of graceful recovery. Without recovery, even a successful attack detection can become an effective Denial-of-Service. We propose an architectural approach to attack detection and recovery called rollback and huddle that monitors a program{\textquoteright}s execution with a lightweight attack-detection module while continuously checkpointing the system state. In the case of an attack, the program state is rolled back to a time before the attack occurred and an additional module is loaded to identify the source of the attack, repair the original vulnerability, and prevent future attacks. The simple hardware modules work alongside a standard computer architecture and aid in attack detection, checkpoint creation, and attack recovery. Experimental results show minimal runtime overhead and resource utilization.},
	author = {Jesse Sathre and Alex Baumgarten and Joseph Zambreno}
}
